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The William B. Lockhart Lecture*
Consent, Contract, and Territory
Lea Brilmayer**
INTRODUCTION
There is an obvious natural affinity between the theory of
contract law and the political theory based on social contract or
consent. Both reflect liberal premises; both treat voluntary as-
sumption of responsibility as the central foundation of obliga-
tion. Both are theories of exchange; exchange of private
property in the one context, and exchange of political rights
and obligations in the other. Although one deals with political
relationships and the other with legal ones, both are based on
the obligated individual's promise. While the consent theory of
political obligation is not founded literally upon any strictly
legal obligation, it gathered strength historically in a society in-
creasingly oriented towards the market transactions that made
such legal obligations important.1 Contract law and con-
tractarian political theory came of age together.
Today, readers of legal and political theory face a veritable
blizzard of writing linking various aspects of market and polit-
* This lecture was delivered on March 30, 1989 at the University of
Minnesota Law School. The Lockhart Lecture Series honors former
University of Minnesota Law School Dean William B. Lockhart.
** Nathan Baker Professor, Yale Law School. The author wishes to
thank a number of generous colleagues who read a draft of the manuscript:
Akhil Amar, Jules Coleman, Bob Ellickson, Tony Kronman, Carol Rovane,
Andy Rutten, and Peter Schuck. Rogers Smith's thoughtful written com-
ments were especially appreciated, although they went far beyond anything
that could adequately be accommodated in this article. In addition, thanks are
owing to the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School for their invi-
tation to deliver the Lockhart Lecture, and to everyone who made my visit so
enjoyable.
1. See generally M. LESSNOFF, SOCIAL CONTRACT chs. 2-5, 7 (1986) (dis-
cussing the history and context of the development of social contract theory);
C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM ch. 2
(1962) (same); Hopfl and Thompson, The History of Contract as a Motif in
Political Thought, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 919, 919-31 (1979) (same).
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ical theory. Some authors seek to explain political institutions
in terms of consent or by analogy to market agreement.2
Others use consent theory to explain how moral principles
might be chosen.3 John Rawls has almost singlehandedly in-
spired a cottage industry devoted to arguments about hypothet-
ical contracts formed in a position of ignorance about one's own
eventual position in society.4 Perhaps because our society is so
overwhelmingly liberal - when "liberal" is understood in the
old-fashioned 5 sense of "voluntaristic" - our journals are domi-
nated by articles exploring this or that aspect of consent or con-
tract theory.
Much of this discussion seems to assume that as a private
matter enforcement of contracts is relatively unproblematic.
The assumption seems to be that if state power could be re-
duced to contract, it would be philosophically justifiable. The
question then is simply whether this supposedly "un-
problematic" contract theory explains the pattern of political
obligations that the author in question wishes to generate.
Lawyers and legal academics, however, should be more dubi-
ous. Contract theory is not unproblematic. There is extensive
recent literature criticizing the normative assumptions underly-
ing legal enforcement of market transactions.6 Not surpris-
ingly, this literature contains some arguments relevant to
political theory relying on the contract paradigm.
One such argument, in particular, casts a rather long
shadow over political theories based on contract or consent.
"Contract" analysis assumes that there is already a prior assign-
ment of entitlements so that the parties to the contract have
something to exchange. An individual with no assets cannot ac-
quire any through the process of contracting, because he or she
2. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT ch.
3 (1962) (seeking to explain political institutions by analogy to market agree-
ments); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ch. 7 (1974) (attempting to
derive a political state from a social contract). For a collection of essays deal-
ing with the interrelated issues of law, political theory, and contract reasoning,
see J. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAw (1988).
3. D. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT chs. 5-7 (1986).
4. The literature on this subject is enormous. See, e.g., C. BEITZ, POLIT-
ICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS pt. 3 (1979) (applying Rawls's
argument to the field of international law); Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Prin-
ciple Serve as a Basis of Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory, 69 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 594, 594-604 (1975) (criticizing Rawls's argument).
5. By "old-fashioned," the author simply means to include free market
theory as a liberal theory. Today, of course, many find market-based analysis
to be "conservative."
6. See, e.g., J. COLEMAN, supra note 2, pt. 2.
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has nothing to bring to the bargaining table. This is a basic fea-
ture of the contractual process, and it is as applicable to the
process of political exchange as it is to the exchange of private
goods. The state must enter the bargaining process with assets
that it did not acquire through exchange, assets obtained
through some other means. Consent, therefore, cannot be used
to justify state power as an initial matter.
To put this point another way, one consents to a transition
from one state of affairs to another, rather than to a particular
state of affairs as an absolute matter. Consent establishes only
that an individual prefers the latter outcome to the earlier one,
not that it is fair to hold the individual to either one. Consent
is about making choices; the fairness of holding an individual to
a choice made, however, depends on the legitimacy of limiting
him or her to a particular set of choices. For a state to present
a limited set of choices to an individual, such as choosing be-
tween assuming political responsibilities while remaining in the
state and leaving the state, the state already must possess a cer-
tain amount of sovereign power over that individual. Other-
wise an individual can choose to stay in the state without
assuming political responsibilities.
Although one might attempt to demonstrate this point di-
rectly, there is an indirect approach that has the advantage of
more clearly illustrating some concrete implications. Consent
as a political theory and consent as a legal theory come to-
gether in one particular doctrinal context: jurisdiction. They
intersect in the jurisdictional context because, while consent
theory is used to justify the exercise of state coercive power -
a classic issue of political theory - determining the outer reach
of state authority is necessary to resolve a legal issue - the le-
gitimacy of a state's acts that extend beyond its borders.7 Fo-
cusing on particular issues of state or national jurisdiction poses
questions of political theory in a concrete context. Certain of
our intuitions, moreover, are more clearly developed in the set-
ting of multistate affairs. Indeed, some conclusions from the
literature criticizing free market exchange theory have already
been noticed in the jurisdictional context.8
We will examine, then, three related areas in which con-
sent plays a prominent role. Our focus will be on certain juris-
dictional questions from conflict of laws, certain contractarian
7. See generally L. BRLMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL AcTs 13-27
(1989) (discussing political legitimacy and jurisdictional boundaries).
8. See text accompanying infra notes 21-22.
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arguments from political theory, and certain theoretical obser-
vations about contract law. Drawing these three areas together
demonstrates that consent cannot play the foundational role
commonly assigned to it. This is true as a theoretical matter,
and not just because it is implausible to believe that agreements
sufficient to establish political obligations were actually made.9
Consent is a seductive notion because it seems to rely on noth-
ing but the parties' voluntary choice. In reality, however, it re-
lies on much more. Consent relies on a prior assignment of
entitlements or, in other words, on a prior identification of the
available range of choices.
This reliance on initial entitlements is well known in the
literature concerning market transactions.' 0 It also is recog-
nized in judicial opinions about consent as a basis for state
court jurisdiction." Yet, the point has apparently not been no-
ticed in discussions of consent in political theory, where it is,
nonetheless, of potentially great importance. The problem in
that context is that both social contract and consent theory de-
pend on a prior assignment of territorial sovereignty that can-
not itself be justified in terms of consent. Furthermore, once
such an assumption of territorial sovereignty is made, consent-
based arguments become fairly superfluous. The role that vol-
untarism plays in consent theory is a thin one indeed.
The first part of this Article examines the three related
areas of conflicts, political theory, and contracts, to highlight
different aspects of consent theory. After outlining the general
thesis about why consent cannot bear the theoretical weight as-
signed to it, this Article investigates consent-based arguments
as applied to two specific problems. One of these applications is
a strictly legal matter, namely, state court jurisdiction based
upon consent. The other is primarily theoretical, although it
also has legal ramifications; that problem arises in immigration
law and concerns the status of the children of persons illegally
9. It has been common since Hume to deny that individual consent could
be inferred from the act of merely remaining in a state. See, e.g., D. HUME,
THEORY OF POLITICS 196-99, 203 (F. Watkins ed. 1951); Pitkin, Obligation and
Consent I, 59 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 990, 994 (1965).
10. See, e.g., J. COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 109 (stating that "[tjhe system
of wealth maximization... cannot provide a basis for an initial assignment of
entitlements"); Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 240 (1980) (stating that wealth maximization principles
favor those who already have money); see also Goldberg, On Positive Theories
of Redistribution, 11 J. ECON. ISSUES 119, 121 (1977) (arguing that one cannot
talk about redistribution without a theory of initial entitlements).
11. See, e.g., Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1111 (Del. 1988).
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present in the United States. These applications reveal the
foundational problems with consent theory and show how con-
sent-based arguments rely in fact on other hidden assumptions.
I. ASPECTS OF CONSENT THEORY
A. CONFLICT OF LAWS
Conflict of laws is a good place to start, because as a gen-
eral matter, consent plays an important role in conflicts theory.
Consent is important when the state attempts to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction; in such cases, consent may either be embod-
ied in a private contract's or inferred from the defendant's
behavior that subjects the defendant to state authority.13 Con-
sent arguments also arise in the enforcement of forum selection
clauses' 4 and in choice of law clauses in private contracts.' 5 In
addition, consent to a particular forum may play an important
role in determining proper venue or deciding a forum non con-
veniens motion.16
Conflicts reasoning illustrates the potential practical appli-
cability of consent theory. Take a relatively straightforward
problem: a state ("the forum") attempts to exercise jurisdiction
over an individual ("the defendant") by claiming that the de-
fendant consented to its jurisdiction by entering the forum and
committing a tort. This is an example of both contract reason-
ing - the defendant agreed to be subject to suit in the state -
and a political theory of legitimate government - the state's
power is legitimate because the defendant has consented. Con-
sent is implicit: the defendant's entrance into the state amounts
to a tacit voluntary subjection to state authority.
The theory of tacit consent, of course, is controversial.
Ever since John Locke asserted that entering a state or remain-
ing or residing within a state constituted tacit consent, political
philosophers have attacked the plausibility of this inference.17
State reliance on consent inferred from someone merely re-
maining in the state is particularly unrealistic. An individual's
unwillingness to incur the extraordinary costs of leaving his or
her birthplace should not be treated as a consensual undertak-
ing to obey state authority. The implausibility of Locke's infer-
12. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 313 (1964).
13. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927).
14. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1972).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1969).
16. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (1988).
17. See M. LESSNOFF, supra note 1, at 83-90.
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ence of "tacit" consent, however, does not present the only
basis for doubt.
When the state defends its exercise of jurisdiction in terms
of the defendant's consent, its argument implicitly rests on an
assumption that the state may legitimately demand consent to
its authority as a condition of the defendant's entrance into the
state. This implicit assumption amounts to a prior assumption
of state territorial sovereignty. Only a state that has territorial
sovereignty may condition entrance upon consent to obey the
law. If the state already possesses territorial sovereignty, how-
ever, reliance on the defendant's consent, whether explicit or
implicit, is unnecessary. Consent is largely superfluous; indeed,
it only serves to mask the fact that territorial sovereignty pro-
vides the real basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. A
variation of our initial simple hypothetical about personal juris-
diction illustrates this point.
Assume that the forum attempts to deduce consent from
the defendant's entrance into a neighboring state and commis-
sion of a tort while present there. For example, the defendant
enters into Wisconsin and Minnesota attempts to infer the de-
fendant's consent to Minnesota authority from this act.
Although Minnesota may infer the defendant's consent from
entry into Minnesota, Minnesota cannot use entrance into Wis-
consin to infer consent to Minnesota authority. There are lim-
its on Minnesota's ability to infer consent.
Presumably, Minnesota cannot attach conditions to the de-
fendant's entry into Wisconsin because entry into Wisconsin is
none of Minnesota's business; conduct within Wisconsin is not
within the scope of Minnesota's legitimate concern. In contrast,
Wisconsin's use of entrance into its territory to infer consent to
Wisconsin authority is unobjectionable. If a state's assertion of
authority, however, is actually premised on the possession of
territorial sovereignty over its land, justifying the state's au-
thority in terms of consent is unnecessary. Instead the state
simply could rely on territorial sovereignty directly. Consent is
superfluous.
Civil procedure teachers will undoubtedly find this reason-
ing familiar. State court authority once was explained entirely
in terms of territorial sovereignty; this was the reign of Pen-
noyer v. Neff.'8 As states sought to expand their authority to
encompass individuals who could not be served within the
18. 95 U.s. 714, 722-23 (1877).
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state, they came to include among the bases for jurisdiction the
individual defendant's consent.19 Although consent sometimes
was explicit, often the state simply inferred consent from the
defendant's commission of a tort within the state. Nonresident
motorist statutes, for example, declared that by driving into the
state, a defendant consented to service of process on the local
secretary of state.20
The United States Supreme Court rejected this legal fiction
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.2 ' In International
Shoe, the Court declined to frame the question of personal
jurisdiction in terms of whether the defendant corporation had
consented. 22 If the state did not have any legitimate power
over the defendant's activities, it could not compel the defen-
dant to consent to jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, the asser-
tion of jurisdiction already was legitimate because it comported
with standards of "fair play and substantial justice," the state's
reliance on the fiction of consent was unnecessary.23
Ironically, since International Shoe the Supreme Court has
had a difficult time defining when an assertion of jurisdiction is
consistent with "fair play and substantial justice." The Court's
initial efforts to define this standard involved inquiries into
foreseeability and purposefulness,24 but in the end, its analysis
has returned to notions of territorial sovereignty.2 The reason
is clear. Even when it is completely foreseeable that a state
will attempt to assert jurisdiction if one behaves in a particular
manner, this does not by itself make assertion of jurisdiction
fair. For instance, suppose Minnesota, in our earlier hypotheti-
cal, publicly declared it would assert jurisdiction over anyone
who entered Wisconsin. Although Minnesota's assertion of
jurisdiction would clearly be foreseeable, this would not make
jurisdiction legitimate. Territoriality cannot be escaped by
framing the issue in terms of foreseeability, purposefulness, or
consent.26
Whether to infer consent is more complicated than first ap-
19. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling
Co., 243 U.S. 93, 94-96 (1917) (upholding nonresident corporation statutes).
20. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927).
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22. Id- at 318.
23. Id- at 316.
24. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-98 (1980).
25. Id.
26. See generally L. BRiLMAYER, supra note 7, at 60-68 (arguing that theo-
ries akin to foreseeability, purposefulness, and consent presuppose sovereign
boundaries).
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pears. An inference of consent typically involves the applica-
tion of a legal rule establishing that certain conduct constitutes
consent. The application of such a legal rule is itself an exer-
cise of political sovereignty. A closer look at some consent deci-
sions illustrates how consent theory requires application of a
state's legal rules to determine whether an inference of consent
is permissible. In National Equipment Rental, Ltd., v. Szuk-
hent 27 the Supreme Court upheld an assertion of New York
jurisdiction premised on a contractual provision stipulating that
the wife of one of the plaintiff's employees would serve as the
defendant's agent for service of process in New York.28
"Agency," however, is a legal, not a factual, conclusion. In his
dissent Justice Black challenged this supposed agency relation,
arguing that this appointment did not constitute a valid agency
under either the agency law of New York or the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.29 The majority's inference of agency was
not simply a value-free acknowledgment of an obvious fact.
Rather, deriving the defendant's consent to jurisdiction from
the contractual stipulation required application of some rule of
law.
Similarly, in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,30 the
Court upheld a contractual forum selection clause even though
it acknowledged that such clauses might be invalid when part
of an adhesion contract.3 1 The determination that some in-
stance of consent is legally adequate necessarily requires appli-
cation of subsidiary contract principles to ascertain whether the
written agreement effectively expressed such consent. In Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,3 2 the Court upheld jurisdiction
premised on a Kansas class action rule that required plaintiffs
to opt out if they did not wish to be part of a nationwide class
action.33 Again, this conclusion does not result from a neutral
determination of the parties' actual wishes. The Court's infer-
ence is a legal one, and not a factual one. Indeed, the Court's
determination conflicts with the usual rules about how consent
is to be expressed, for as a matter of contract law, silence usu-
ally does not constitute consent.34
27. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
28. Id- at 313.
29. Id. at 321-29 (Black, J., dissenting).
30. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
31. Id. at 17.
32. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
33. Id at 806-14.
34. See 1 A. CORBIN, CoNTRACTS § 72, at 304, § 73, at 310 (1963).
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By the same token, theories of "waiver" of objections to
state jurisdiction depend on legal conclusions; they are not sim-
ply value-free factual inferences. An inference of waiver typi-
cally involves the application of a procedural default rule.
Perhaps most intriguing is the Supreme Court's decision in In-
surance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee.35 In this case, the defendant challenged the court's
personal jurisdiction and the plaintiff sought discovery on this
issue. When the defendant refused to respond to discovery, the
trial court sanctioned the defendant by imposing an adverse
finding on the factual issues for which the defendant did not
provide information.36 The court thus effectively subjected the
defendant to its adjudicative jurisdiction for failing to provide
discovery. On appeal, the defendant argued it should not be
sanctioned for failing to obey the court's orders because it was
not properly subject to the court's authority.37 The Supreme
Court, however, was not persuaded that there was a problem
with the way the forum 'bootstrapped" itself into authority.38
Such bootstrapping is nearly unavoidable where jurisdic-
tion is premised on consent or waiver. The application of a
legal rule is necessary to find an effective expression of consent
or a valid waiver. There must be a good basis, therefore, for
holding the defendant to the particular rule inferring such
waiver or consent. If the forum merely applies its own waiver
or consent rules, and then uses the waiver or consent to justify
its adjudication of the case, its reasoning is circular. It uses its
authority to infer consent, and thus to rationalize its own exer-
cise of authority.
The same circularity is involved in inferring consent from
the defendant's entrance into the forum and commission of a
tort. Inferring consent from the defendant's activities involves
attaching conditions to the activities that he or she engages in.
Attaching such conditions involves the exercise of sovereign au-
thority. The forum does not simply make a factual inference
about what the defendant intended; indeed, the defendant may
have given ample objective evidence of his or her intent not to
be bound.39 In the case of deducing consent from entrance into
35. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
36. Id. at 699.
37. Id. at 706.
38. Id at 694.
39. This is certainly true in the Insurance Corp. of Ireland case, where
the defendant was in fact litigating the issue of personal jurisdiction at the
time that the inference was made. Id.
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the state, a specific sort of inference is involved. Rather than
inferring consent from contract stipulation, failure to respond
to discovery request, or silence in the face of an "opt-out" no-
tice, the state infers consent from the defendant's coming
within its geographical boundaries. Although consent argu-
ments always require some legal norm to support the inference,
the territorial nature of the inference is clearest when consent
relies on entrance into the state. Entrance signifies consent
only because it is generally understood that states possess sov-
ereignty over their geographical territory.
Of course, in the conflicts context, the state's sovereign au-
thority is relatively unproblematic: jurisdictional due process is
analyzed against a constitutional backdrop that clearly recog-
nizes the territorial legitimacy of both the separate states and
of our nation-state as a whole. The problem remains that when
the state already possesses authority over the individual, it is
unclear why a consent argument is necessary or illuminating.
The state instead can base its exercise of authority directly on
the individual's presence within the scope of its legitimate
power. This foundation, however, is apparently lacking when
one moves from the legal context, where the states' territorial
legitimacy is taken for granted, into the context of political the-
ory. A primary function of political theory is to explain how
and why states come to have sovereign powers in the first
place.
B. POLITICAL THEORY
Although we initially phrased these arguments in jurisdic-
tional terms - in the context, that is, of interstate relations -
they are equally applicable to consent-based explanations of the
state's purely domestic coercive power. As our reference to
John Locke illustrates, consent has been thought by many
political philosophers to be an important element of the state's
legitimate power over its own people within its own territory.
The Western liberal democratic tradition, in particular, regards
the voluntary assumption of citizenship responsibilities as the
best explanation of the state's right to rule.40 Since Locke,
many theorists have attempted to explain government author-
ity in terms of such consent, whether express or tacit.41 Some-
40. See, e.g., Pitkin, supra note 9, at 990 (arguing that consent is the most
commonly offered answer to the question of political obligation).
41. Thomas Hobbes was one of the first proponents of a contract approach
to political obligation; Jean Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant also made
[Vol. 74:1
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times the state's power is explained simply by the individual's
consent to an existing state's authority; in the alternative, such
power can be explained as a social contract to form a state in
the first instance. For purposes of terminological clarity, we
will call the former consent theory and the latter social con-
tract theory. Both are contractarian, but in the former, the
contract is with an existing state, while with the latter, the con-
tract is with a group of other people prior to state formation.
Once the difficulties with establishing consent-based argu-
ments in the multi-jurisdictional context are recognized, the
difficulties in using such an argument domestically also become
apparent. We can start with the notion of consent to an ex-
isting state, and take up social contract explanations later.
Consent, whether express or tacit, apparently turns on prior as-
sumptions about territorial sovereignty. To use John Locke's
example, if England did not have territorial sovereignty, it
could not infer the obligations of English subjects from their
residence or entrance upon the land.42 First consider express
consent. Even if persons expressly promised the King of
France that as a condition of entering or remaining in England
they would abide by French law, this does not create an obliga-
tion to obey.
The same is true when consent is tacit or hypothetical.
When consent is tacit, France simply cannot infer from entry
into or residence in England that persons are obliged to support
the French government. Proving hypothetical consent without
a prior assignment of territorial sovereignty is even more diffi-
cult than showing express consent. Rawls, for example, asks
what would constitute a fair political society that persons would
agree to be part of under appropriate circumstances for reflec-
tion.4 3 A sufficiently fair society is one that would command
hypothetical consent. This hypothetical consent, however, re-
quires a prior division into territorially sovereign states; in a
world divided into a number of equally fair governments, the
mere substantive fairness of a state provides no way of knowing
which state the individual is obligated to obey.44 There is no
obligation to obey all sufficiently just governments simply be-
cause each is fair enough that a person would have agreed to
important contributions, as have Robert Nozick and John Rawls in recent
times. See M. LESSNOFF, supra note 1, chs. 5, 7.
42. See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 60-62 (discussing Locke's theory).
43. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE ch. 1 (1971).
44. See A. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 31-
35 (1979) (discussing "particularized" obligations).
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obey it behind a veil of ignorance. Under such a theory, an in-
dividual would be obliged to obey all just governments
equally.45
Our conflict of laws analysis reveals that consent argu-
ments depend on some prior assignment of territorial sover-
eignty. The same is true when the state's underlying legitimacy
is examined. In this context, however, the problem is far more
serious because here the very question is the legitimacy of the
state's authority in the first instance. For jurisdictional pur-
poses we simply assumed that the state's territorial authority
was legitimate; now we must ask about the legitimacy even at
the territorial core. Multistate authority in the conflicts con-
text is derived from the state's sovereignty over its land. In the
political theory context, however, it begs the question to derive
the state's initial claim to assert authority from the state's terri-
torial sovereignty.
In other words, in the absence of any prior assumption of
the state's legitimate power, the state cannot rely on territorial
sovereignty to justify its power over people. Some prior assign-
ment of territorial power is necessary to establish power over
people under a consent theory, but how can this initial assign-
ment itself be justified? We will refer to this problem as "the
bootstrapping objection" because most consent arguments pre-
sume the very state power that they attempt to justify. The
state merely bootstraps itself into authority by inferring con-
sent from the individual's entering or remaining within the
state's legitimate sphere of territorial authority. The consent
argument ultimately turns on the state's power to regulate -
the power to exclude or to attach conditions to entrance. This,
however, poses a seemingly insoluble problem. How can the
state ever come into being through consent when it must al-
ready possess power before consent can be established?
Certainly some authors do attempt to describe how a state
can be formed from scratch, without any prior assumption of
authority.46 To better understand such efforts we must turn to
the second sort of contractarian argument, namely, the social
contract between a group of private individuals. Up until now,
we proceeded as though the individual had a direct agreement
with the state, a public contract between the individual citizen
45. Rawls would require only that one support all just institutions "that
apply to us." J. RAWLS, supra note 43, at 334. His lack of clarity on this point
is discussed in A. SIMMONS, supra note 44, at 147-52.
46. See infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
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and the state. In this form, the consent argument is most vul-
nerable to the "bootstrapping objection." There is, however,
another explanation why consent provides a basis for sovereign
authority. The consensual agreement need not exist between
the individual and the state, but rather among all involved indi-
viduals. Instead of a public contract with the government, one
privately agrees with other individuals to form the state. This
distinction between consent and social contract is analogous to
the distinction between different types of consensual argu-
ments for jurisdiction in the legal context. The jurisdictional
argument that the individual submits to the state by entering
onto its territory corresponds to consent theory. The argument
that the individual consents to the state by contractual provi-
sions in a private agreement with another individual, however,
corresponds to social contract theory.
One of the best known recent attempts to derive the polit-
ical state from social contract is Robert Nozick's argument in
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.47 Nozick explains how a group of
individuals living in a state of nature might join together and
establish a government by agreement.48 His account is reminis-
cent of Hobbes.49 In a similar vein, David Gauthier has sought
to derive familiar moral principles from hypothetical consensus
in a state of nature.50 Arguments based on social contract the-
ory seem better situated to avoid the bootstrapping objection
than consent-based arguments. Rather than relying on an
agreement between an individual and a theoretical entity
whose legitimate existence has not yet been justified, social
contract theory hypothesizes an agreement between two or
more equal individuals. One individual agrees to respect the
state that is about to be created as long as the others do. Be-
cause no one has a prior obligation to obey the state, each indi-
vidual can assume a new obligation in exchange for the others
doing so.
The social contract theorist might respond to the bootstrap-
ping objection in the following way. "Yes," she might admit,
"the consent theorist presumes the existence of a legitimate
state that can bargain with an individual and obtain his or her
consent. The consent theorist takes this important fact for
47. R. NozICK, ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
48. Id- ch. 2.
49. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 17 (1651). For a recent effort to de-
velop Hobbes's thinking through the use of game-theory techniques, see J.
HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOcIAL CONTRACT TRADITION ch. 6 (1986).
50. D. GAUTHIER, supra note 3, chs. 6-7.
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granted, and therefore begs the question. In contrast, social
contract theory explains how states first come into being. So-
cial contract theory does not assume the existence of a legiti-
mate state, but instead justifies a state as the product of private
agreement in a state of nature." The social contract theorist
might add that once a legitimate state is formed, it can use con-
sent theory to justify its powers over persons who either are
born in the state or enter the state's territory at a later date.
Whether such a social contract theory escapes bootstrap-
ping objections depends on the nature of the state that is cre-
ated. Nozick's apparent goal is to justify the existence of the
sort of territorial nation-states that we normally take for
granted - although Nozick's state possesses admittedly mini-
mal powers.51 If justifying this type of state is the object, the
problem of prior assumption of territorial sovereignty remains
unresolved. Nozick's analysis does not answer the question of
how the individuals who initially set up the state possess the
requisite territorial sovereignty over the particular landmass.
Territorial sovereignty is still assumed, although it is assumed
at the initial stage to be in the hands of individuals rather than
vested in the yet-to-be created state.
To see why social contract theory necessarily involves an
assumption of territorial sovereignty, consider how nation-
states are thought to emerge. How does a state created by a
group of individuals come to claim authority over land that is
the functional equivalent of territorial sovereignty? Perhaps
the response to this question relies on the fact that this group
of individuals started out with some sort of ownership rights to
the land. This requires that some notion of ownership already
exist; and acquisition of property is itself a problematic no-
tion.52 But that is another matter. Perhaps establishing owner-
ship rights is easier than justifying the territorial sovereignty of
governmental authority. Let us start, then, with a group of
neighborhood people who all own land and get together to cre-
ate a sovereign state. We can imagine them exchanging vows of
obedience so that the new entity they create can function as a
legitimate territorial government.
51. Nozick claims, for instance, that a private protection scheme falls
short of constituting a state because it does not have a monopoly of force in a
particular territory. R. NozIcK, supra note 2, at 51. On his preference for a
minimal state, see id at 144-296.
52. Nozick recognizes this clearly. See id at 174-78. See also L. BECKER,
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 32-48 (1977) (criticizing
Locke's labor theory of property acquisition).
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The transition from property ownership in private hands to
territorial sovereignty in the state's hands, however, is some-
what mysteriout. Territorial sovereignty and property owner-
ship are not necessarily the same thing. It is possible for
sovereignty to be vested in one entity's hands, while property
ownership is vested in another's. For example, New York's
purchase of property in Connecticut does not make New York
sovereign over that land.5 3 Connecticut, not New York, pos-
sesses the right to tax and regulate the property. Admittedly
the precise difference between ownership and property is diffi-
cult to articulate. The distinction probably depends on one's
idea of property and one's idea of sovereignty, and both of these
concepts no doubt have changed in content historically. Terri-
torial sovereignty, however, clearly includes the right to regu-
late persons within the state's territory, for instance by
applying local criminal law. It includes, as Nozick argues,54 the
ability to create a monopoly of force upon a particular piece of
land.
Territorial power must also encompass the right to regu-
late nonsignatories to the agreement. Nozick for instance rec-
ognizes the need to bind dissenters or holdouts, and seeks to
explain why this regulation is fair.5 5 In addition, the new state,
if it resembles contemporary state institutions, must be able to
make the original agreement not only irrevocable but also bind-
ing against future property holders. The power that Nozick
seeks to vest in nation-states is, in this respect, quite substan-
tial. The state is presumed to have these sovereign powers by
the end of the social contract process. How does the state ac-
quire these powers? Can such powers be granted by private in-
dividuals who merely have private ownership rights?
Perhaps the property rights of the original participants al-
ready include such legitimate powers.56 If so, then at the time
53. See, e.g., Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1923) (holding that
land one state owns may be subject to eminent domain power of another
state).
54. See generally R. NoziCK, supra note 2, at 108-10, 113-18 (explaining
how independents might come to be included within the private protective as-
sociation that is dominant within a territory, so that the private association
might come to have a monopoly).
55. I& at 108-10.
56. Nozick, for example, states that "[t]he rights possessed by the state are
already possessed by each individual in a state of nature" and adds that there
are no rights unique to states. Id at 118. On the other hand, he does not seem
to believe that an individual has sovereign rights over his own property - he
seems to envision governmental units having some minimum size or popula-
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the social contract is entered into, they might retain mere own-
ership rights but cede the territorial sovereignty to the new
state. For individuals to transfer such powers to the newly cre-
ated state, however, they must possess something rather like
territorial sovereignty over their initial holdings. This assumes,
however, that prior to state formation there existed in essence
a group of small kingdoms with each owner of territory essen-
tially possessing governmental power over his or her property.
Merely locating territorial sovereignty in human hands does
not solve the problem of identifying the initial source of territo-
rial sovereignty. In a monarchy, all governmental power is
vested in the hands of a single person but the problem of the
initial assignment still exists. An individual must possess sov-
ereignty before he or she can extract consent from persons that
enter onto the territory. The social contract theory assumes a
human being possesses such sovereignty and thus, ultimately,
encounters the bootstrapping objection.
The bootstrapping problem arises because bargaining nec-
essarily occurs between an individual and some other entity
that already possesses the power to regulate or exclude.
Whether the bargaining entity is human, social, or bureaucratic
is unimportant because consent-based arguments do not justify
the vesting of territorial sovereignty in the hands of any entity.
Although the line between what constitutes ownership rights
and what constitutes sovereignty rights is difficult to draw, bas-
ing sovereignty on an agreement among property owners does
not explain how the owners can grant more power than they
possess. If ownership does not include sovereignty, the owners
cannot grant the new state a power over others that the owners
do not possess. If ownership does encompass this power, the in-
dividual owners already enjoy full sovereign powers over their
land and this sovereignty itself must be explained.
These bootstrapping objections to contractarian formation
of a government do not necessarily arise when parties create
governmental entities that lack territorial status. One might,
for instance, agree with another individual that in the event of
a dispute both will submit to binding arbitration. Although the
arbitrator's authority is established by consent, its authority is
not territorial. In such cases, only the actual participants are
bound; the extent of authority is not defined territorially. Simi-
tion. Id- at 117. It is not clear, therefore, whether Nozick believes that territo-
rial sovereignty is unique to the state or whether it is also possessed by
individuals.
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larly, through a forum selection clause, two individuals might
agree to submit their dispute to a judicial decision maker in a
particular state's courts. Neither of these devices, however, ex-
plains the origin of territorial nation-states: territorial nation-
states cannot be established without a prior showing of terri-
torial sovereignty.
Furthermore, consent does not establish territorial sover-
eignty. In most instances, territorial sovereignty is established
by sheer force or power, although it occasionally results from
the sale or exchange of territory.57 If one's obligation to obey
one's state depends on territorial sovereignty, the role consent
plays becomes exceedingly thin. Territoriality instead occupies
the crucial role and consent arguments become superfluous.
The reasons why this consent problem arises in the political
theory context are revealed by examining the foundations of
contract law.
C. CONTRACTS
The problem with developing a consent-based approach to
state authority is endemic to the theory of contracts and mar-
kets. Like consent theories of jurisdiction and social contract
or consent theory of state political authority, contract law de-
pends on the logic of exchange and mutual advantage. Justifi-
cation for private contract or market theory can be found in the
fact that contract involves exchange in which each side volun-
tarily assumes obligations in order to obtain some advantage
from the other.58 After the exchange, each side supposedly is
better off because each used the bargain to improve his or her
situation.
This, at least, is the main contracts paradigm. Today, this
paradigm is associated with the law and economics perspective.
The justification for a market system is derived from the con-
sensual nature of market transactions, but not every aspect of a
market system is a product of consent. In particular, contrac-
tual exchange depends on every participant having something
to exchange. This results in two related difficulties.
57. See generally L. BRILmAYER, supra note 7, at 75-78 (discussing the dif-
ficulty of justifying a distribution of territory that was, historically, a product
of force).
58. Not all contracts specialists analyze contractual relationships in terms
of exchange. See, e.g., C. FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMIsE: A THEORY OF CON-
TRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1-17 (1981) (analyzing contract formation in terms of
moral obligations).
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First, the individual who has nothing of market value can
obtain nothing in exchange, because he or she cannot find a
trade to make. One's ability to participate in exchanges de-
pends upon one's initial assignment of property rights. Second,
this initial assignment of property rights is not derived from
the participants' consent. It antedates consensual transactions,
and cannot be justified in market terms. Combined, these two
observations suggest that even if the overall contracts paradigm
is found persuasive, the eventual distribution of property in so-
ciety does not result entirely from consensual behavior. The in-
itial allocation of property is determined in some other manner,
and at best, subsequent consensual exchanges dilute the effect
of that initial distribution. At worst, the subsequent consensual
exchanges may have no effect on original inequities, or may
under certain circumstances make the inequities worse.5 9
The private market problem of the initial distribution of
goods is structurally analogous to the probler of consent-based
approaches to political authority. Consent or social contract
theories of the state depend on the state having initially been
granted territorial sovereignty. If consent theories are based on
exchange, each individual must receive something in exchange
for incurring a political obligation. The state must, therefore,
start out having something to trade. This problem is a feature
of voluntary exchange transactions generally, rather than of
consent theories of jurisdiction or political theory specifically.
Our critique of consent theory is essentially a critique that has
been leveled against the law and economics school.
In some respects, in fact, the critique is far more powerful
when leveled against consent-based theories of government
than when leveled against market exchange theory in general.
The reason has to do with the way that consensual transactions
tend to dilute the effect of the initial distribution of goods over
time. A market system requires an initial assignment of prop-
erty rights for exchange to take place. This initial assignment
determines to some extent the subsequent transactions that oc-
cur and the eventual distribution of property. The eyentual dis-
tribution is thus a product of two things: the initial distribution
and the subsequent history of trading.
One might illustrate the respective roles of these two ele-
ments by analogy to a card game. Imagine a game in which the
59. For example, if one of the parties has a monopoly of a good that is
necessary to another's survival, that party might take advantage of this
situation.
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dealer distributes five cards to each player, each player adds up
the total face value of his or her hand, and the winner is the
player with the largest number of points. In this game, the
identity of the winner is uniquely determined by how the cards
are originally dealt. Contrast this game with a more compli-
cated (and interesting) game such as bridge or poker. In bridge
or poker the hand initially dealt to each player influences the
course of play, and the eventual outcome of the game is in part
a product of the original deal. There is much room, however,
for skillful maneuver, and the abilities of the players as well as
the initial distribution of cards determine the winner. The rela-
tive roles of initial assignment and subsequent transactions in
particular card games are a matter of degree and are deter-
mined by the games' rules.
I would argue that the private market for goods is analo-
gous to the latter, more complicated game while the "market"
for consent to state authority is analogous to the more deter-
ministic game. In the political market, bargaining individuals
do not alter the initial assignment of territorial sovereignty in
the course of making exchanges. When an individual agrees to
obey state authority in exchange for entrance into the territory,
the state does not relinquish any of its sovereignty to the indi-
vidual. The state retains the same amount of sovereignty over
its territory after the transaction as before. The effects of the
initial distribution in the political market are not diluted be-
cause the elements' assigned in the initial distribution do not
change hands.
The political market is a market in which the initially as-
signed rights and goods are not freely alienable. Thus, a better
analogy than a free market in goods would be a hypothetical
rental market in which the landlords are allowed to rent, but
not to sell, their rental property. In this hypothetical market,
the landlord class is fixed, and tenants may negotiate with dif-
ferent landlords. Tenants do not bargain with landlords for
ownership rights, however, and at most receive the right to use
particular pieces of property. Exchanges may take place be-
tween landlords, just as nation-states may exchange particular
portions of their territory, but tenants themselves never come
to own property outright. The basic contours of the distribu-
tion - the delineation into two classes, each with a distinctive
type of property - remains unchanged.
We should examine at this point one possible objection
that is suggested by our analogy between contract enforcement
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and social contract theory. One might object that consent the-
ory is based on a theory of gratuitous promise. Contract law it-
self suggests that there may be differences between gratuitous
promises and legal obligations based on mutual exchange.60
Our earlier analysis of consent and social contract theory re-
quired the equivalent of consideration on both sides.6 1 When
the analysis involves an exchange, both parties to the exchange
must bring something to the bargaining table. This is where
the problem arises in consent and social contract theory. Either
the nation-state or the collected citizens must possess some
power over the would-be entrant, such that there is something
to offer the individual in exchange for his or her promise to
obey. This power, however, arises out of pre-existing territorial
sovereignty, not consent.
Focusing on an individual's gratuitous promise of obedience
might avoid this territoriality problem. Under a gratuitous
promise model, the state does not need anything to offer in ex-
change. Although contract law generally does not accord legal
enforcement to gratuitous promises, it does not deny their
moral status. Political philosophers, moreover, are not bound
by the vagaries of consideration doctrine. Gratuitous promises
thus may provide a possible basis for moral and political
obligation.
To frame the problem this way, however, is to highlight
the potential theory's difficulties. When the basis for moral
and political obligation moves away from the bargain model,
two difficulties arise. First, people are unlikely to gratuitously
enter such an agreement and, second, if they did, its terms
might be unfair. Certainly, some individuals may gratuitously
promise to obey the state; some, however, may not. What can
the state do about holdouts? Under a gratuitous promise the-
ory the state cannot exclude holdouts from the territory or
otherwise bribe or threaten them into obedience. Setting aside
the problem of holdouts, how does the state even know which
individuals agreed and which did not? Consent theory uses ter-
ritoriality both to define the benefits the state has to offer and
to distinguish which individuals tacitly consented to state au-
thority. Under a theory of gratuitous promise, receiving bene-
fits cannot determine which persons consented, because the
60. Most contracts under common law are supposed to be supported by
consideration. See 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 34, § 110, at 490-91, § 114, at 498.
61. "Consideration" is the benefit that is sought or detriment that is un-
dertaken through the process of mutual exchange. Id § 110, at 491-93.
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state has no benefits to bestow. Territoriality also is essential,
therefore, under a theory of gratuitous promise. Unless the in-
dividual explicitly agrees - and this is not likely in very many
cases - the state cannot, absent a prior assignment of terri-
torial sovereignty, ascertain whether an implicit promise ever
was made.
Even if a gratuitous agreement took place, the fairness of
enforcing such an agreement is unclear. A gratuitous agree-
ment is one-sided and therefore seems potentially unfair even
if express consent exists. Contract law certainly deems ex-
tremely one-sided contracts suspect under the doctrine of un-
conscionability.62 Although social contract theorists are not
bound by the contours of American contract law, the moral rea-
soning underlying the unconscionability doctrine should have
some application to gratuitous contracts in the social contract
context. Why should a one-sided promise to obey the state be
enforceable?6 3
II. CHOICE AND CONSENT
Consent is a seductive notion because it seems to explain
obligations in terms of the obligated individual's voluntary
choice. By focusing on choice, however, consent theory discour-
ages analysis of an unresolved and important problem: how did
the individual come to have that set of choices and not another?'
The set of choices available to any individual engaged in bar-
62. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1989) (stating that courts may refuse to en-
force unconscionable contracts).
63. Here we encounter something of a paradox. On the one hand, it
seems that a bargain that offers little advantage to the individual might be sus-
pect, precisely because it is one-sided. A fairer agreement would be one that
offers the individual a substantial benefit. On the other hand, to the extent
that the agreement is obviously of great advantage to the individual, the as-
sumption that the agreement is a product of true choice is somewhat undercut.
This is particularly true in the international context, for the great advantage
to be achieved by entry into a particular state may in some cases tend to show
duress.
Consider, for example, an individual's decision to seek entry into the
United States. If the individual is persecuted in her home state, then obvi-
ously there is a very great incentive to seek refuge elsewhere. Precisely be-
cause she would be so greatly advantaged by entry into the United States, we
might think that her agreement to obey United States law might be unen-
forceable for reasons of duress. On the other hand, to the extent that it makes
little or no difference to her whether she is admitted to the United States, this
undercuts the argument that it is fair to hold her to her agreement because of
the benefits that she received.
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gaining is a function of the prior assignment of rights and obli-
gations that all other participants bring to the bargaining table.
The set of choices is determined by the prior assignment of
rights because it includes only choices that are advantageous to
all participants. If all transactions must be consensual, then the
range of available alternatives includes only transactions that
are advantageous to both parties to the transaction. "Advanta-
geous," furthermore, means at least as generous as the current
assignment. A set of choices is not advantageous if all alterna-
tives make the individual worse off. This is true even though
the individual "has been given a choice." Merely giving an indi-
vidual a choice between alternatives seems to show that a true
choice has been offered, and that the individual's chosen alter-
native results from consent. Yet, if all alternatives offered are
less attractive than the individual's current assignment, al-
lowing the individual to select the least undesirable alternative
does not mean that the individual consented.
Two implications follow. First, when an individual and the
state enter into an exchange relationship, the state constrains
the individual's set of choices because the only choices available
are transactions advantageous to the state given its initial as-
signment of territorial sovereignty. Allowing an individual to
choose among available options does not make the state's abil-
ity to limit the range of choices a product of consent as well. In
this respect, consent or choice plays a limited role in justifying
particular exercises of coercive power. When an individual
selects one alternative over another, the imposition of that al-
ternative initially seems explainable in terms of choice or con-
sent. For example, an individual's decision to leave one state
for another may express a preference through exit or en-
trance.64 Emigration, however, is very costly, and one's choice
to remain may only show that changing states is not worth the
price. Moreover, if all other states have the same objectionable
features, an individual who remains in the state does not really
choose to put up with these features. The individual's choice of
one alternative over another is a function of the range of avail-
able alternatives, and the state, by restricting these choices, al-
ready exercises its sovereign prerogative.
The second implication is that the state cannot argue that
an individual absolutely consents to anything. Phrasing things
in terms of choice highlights the fact that preferences and
agreements are relative. An individual consents to a transition
64. See A. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 96-98 (1970).
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from one position to another to improve his or her condition
but does not thereby consent to the subsequent position in the
abstract. As a political theory, consent justifies moving from
one distribution of assets or power to another based on the indi-
vidual's consent to alter the distribution. Choice and consent,
however, are relative and not absolute concepts. Consent can-
not justify a state of affairs as an absolute matter, because an
individual's consent to some particular state of affairs turns
only on whether it is preferable to the status quo. Consent is a
process value,65 not a justification of a particular state of affairs.
These two observations often are overlooked; it is some-
times assumed that a given state of affairs is consensual merely
because a choice was offered. In the 1960s, bumper stickers de-
clared "America: Love It or Leave It." The underlying assump-
tion was that it was legitimate to limit the available alternatives
to being loyal to the United States as it was, or leaving the
country. An individual who chose to stay in the United States,
therefore, promised loyalty to existing institutions. Although
representing a somewhat primitive form of the logic, this
bumper sticker is a version of the argument from tacit consent.
In both situations, the individual is denied the most desirable
choice: remaining in the country while denying the legitimate
right to govern of existing institutions.
The characterization of available alternatives as offering a
free choice depends on whether one should concede the right of
the other participants to structure the range of choices. Why
should a nation be able to demand obedience in exchange for
an individual's entrance into or residence within the country?
The state asserts a sovereign prerogative by claiming that an
obligation of loyalty follows from an individual's entrance or
residence. The individual is denied certain options because
they are not attractive to the state. This is acceptable if the
state starts out with certain sovereign or property rights; rights
to narrow the range of choices. If both participants initially
possess rights against the other, the situation is symmetric;
each has the authority to narrow the range of choices because
the bargain must be advantageous to both sides. Consent argu-
ments, however, cannot establish this sovereign prerogative in
the first instance. It remains for us to come to grips with such
65. For a general discussion of process values see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DIsTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvEW 73-179 (1980), and Summers, Evalu-
ating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CO-
NELL L. REV. 1, 1-52 (1974).
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assumptions generally, to evaluate their normative acceptability
and outline their normative foundations.
III. APPLICATION OF CONSENT-BASED ARGUMENTS
Consent theory focuses on the choice made after the set of
choices is already structured. This observation casts doubt on
arguments purportedly based on nothing more than the parties'
voluntary submission to state authority. The arguments previ-
ously set out regarding consent and territory are potentially
relevant to a number of different areas. One of these areas is
jurisdiction in the usual technical sense: whether a particular
court has the adjudicative authority to entertain a dispute. In
some cases the parties' obligations really can be established by
consent - primarily cases involving private contracts - but in
most other situations, consent masks the true rationale:
territoriality.
Another area is immigration law; recent arguments suggest
that liberal, consensual, notions of political theory should in-
form our immigration policies.66 In both of these areas consent-
based arguments are quite misleading. Consent is an important
concept in many areas of law and legal theory, and these exam-
ples illustrate the broad applicability of consent arguments as a
basis for authority.
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The earlier discussion outlined how consent theory has
been used to justify the assertion of state authority.6 7 We can
differentiate between private and public agreements to submit
to a particular state's adjudicative jurisdiction because the im-
plications of consent theory for jurisdictional problems depend
on the precise source of the consent. Private stipulations to
submit to a state's jurisdiction are agreed to in the context of
contractual relations between private persons. Public agree-
ments are relations between an individual and a state that os-
tensibly constitute the individual's consent to state authority.
Private agreements to submit to a state's jurisdiction are
very different from public agreements. Private consensual sub-
missions to jurisdiction may result from a genuine exchange
and should be accorded greater deference than public ones.
66. See P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 116-40 (1985).
67. See supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
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Although private exchanges sometimes involve an imbalance in
the parties' bargaining power, often they do not. A contractual
stipulation is an actual (as opposed to a tacit or hypothetical)
agreement, and it also avoids the bootstrapping objection. The
bootstrapping problem is more severe in the public context be-
cause an assumption of state authority must precede the state's
ability to make concessions. In the private context, however,
the concession is an exchange of property - the jurisdiction se-
lection clause is agreed to in exchange for a lower price or some
reciprocal concession. Thus, in the private context, the forum's
argument for authority is based on a prior assumption of the
contracting parties' property ownership, rather than on a prior
assumption of state authority. Although the concept of prop-
erty ownership is philosophically troublesome, it avoids ration-
alizing state authority by an assumption of state authority.
Despite this fact, the inference of consent from a private
contractual relationship nonetheless has problematic aspects.
Private contracts do not simply interpret themselves without
the aid of law. In particular, the apparent simplicity of the in-
ference of private consent is misleading. Although interpreta-
tion of a contractual relationship at first might appear to
involve nothing more than a factual inference, in reality, more
complicated legal assumptions also are at work. Perhaps the
best example of the need for legal assumptions concerns adhe-
sion contracts.68 Although adhesion contracts and contracts re-
sulting from fraud or overreaching generally are not
enforced,6 9 the line between enforceable and unenforceable
contracts is difficult to draw.70 Some source of legal standards
is necessary, therefore, to show where the line should be
drawn.
In addition, assumptions about agency such as those pres-
68. An adhesion contract is a "take it or leave it" contract where one side
sets all the terms; such contracts often are a product of unequal distribution of
bargaining power. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 34, § 559, at 271 n.20, § 559, at 262.
69. See, e.g., Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1973)
(stating that courts will not enforce contract clause that results from fraud);
Morton v. Zidell Explorations, Inc., 695 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1982), cert de-
nied, 460 U.S. 1039 (1983) (stating that courts will not enforce contract clauses
that result from overreaching); Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion. An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1195 (1983) (stating that the modern
trend is for courts to decide in favor of the adhering party).
70. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)
(suggesting that a court might not honor an inequitable forum selection
clause).
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ent in the Szukhent case are based on norms of agency law.71
In Szukhent, the defendants by contractual stipulation had ap-
pointed the plantifff's wife as their agent for service of pro-
cess.72 Even if the conclusion that the plantiff's wife was the
defendant's agent had been factually unimpeachable - and it
was not - this does not obscure the necessity for legal assump-
tions to infer the defendant's consent in this manner. By the
same token, imputing consent through other legal connections,
such as corporate relationships or conspiracies, is not a simple
factual inference but requires a legal conclusion.73 Unfortu-
nately, courts often address such questions as though some gen-
eial common law supplied the answers.74
Of course, in many circumstances the need for a source of
positive law is not fatal. For example, the involved states' sub-
stantive law may be identical and may recognize the agency re-
lationship or enforce the contract provision. In some cases, the
facts may unequivocally demonstrate that consent exists under
any of the potentially applicable legal principles. The point is
merely that consensus of this sort cannot be taken for granted.
One should not fall back unreflectively on some "general com-
mon law" notion of what constitutes consent, agency, or other
legal relationships. Consent is a complicated notion and "gen-
eral common law" is notoriously unreliable.75
In contrast to private contractual agreements, public agree-
ments involve direct relations between an individual and a state
that ostensibly constitute consent. Traditionally two types of
public relationships have served as a basis for jurisdiction. The
first such public relationship is waiver: a defendant's waiver of
his or her rights to protest jurisdiction purportedly is estab-
lished through certain types of litigation conduct. For instance,
if the defendant does not object to personal jurisdiction at the
outset of litigation, the objection is waived under Rule 12(h) of
the Fedoral Rules of Civil Procedure. In Phillips Petroleum,
the Supreme Court held that absent plantiffs consented to
71. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
72. Id. at 313.
73. See Brilmayer and Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive
Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracy, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1, 8-
15 (1986) (discussing the methods by which substantive legal relationships in-
fluence assessments of personal jurisdiction).
74. Id. at 24.
75. "General common law" has been a discredited notion ever since the
decision of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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jurisdiction by not opting out of a class action.76 The defend-
ant's failure to comply with a discovery request in Insurance
Corp. of Ireland effectively waived its jurisdictional rights. 77
The problem of applicable legal standards, discussed earlier
in private consent cases, also arises in the context of jurisdic-
tional waivers. The existence and legitimate applicability of a
legal rule that infers consent or waiver from certain litigation
behavior is necessary before a valid waiver or consent can be
inferred. This objection was raised in both Phillips Petroleum
and Insurance Corp. of Ireland; in both cases the defendant
protested the bootstrapping nature of the consent or waiver in-
ference. 78 Waiver involves bootstrapping because the conduct
in question does not constitute consent without applying some
legal rule inferring consent from such conduct. The courts de-
ciding waiver cases, however, do not address the state's right to
impose its regulations on the defendant. Rather, courts employ
their own waiver or consent rules to establish their jurisdic-
tion.79 As with interpretation of consent in private contracts,
however, the need for a source of law is not fatal if all the po-
tentially applicable positive laws allow the inference °8 0
In contrast, reliance on pre-existing sovereignty is the
greatest and most problematic in the second application of con-
sent theory to public agreements. In these cases, the state in-
fers consent from the defendant's acts directed toward the state
rather than from litigation conduct. Consent may be either ex-
press or implicit. Consent is implicit when the state infers it
from, for example, the defendant's entrance and commission of
a tort in the state. When the state requires a corporation to
submit to jurisdiction in exchange for the right to do business
there, consent is explicit.8 '
76. 472 U.S. at 806-14.
77. 456 U.S. at 709.
78. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 812; Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456
U.S. at 694.
79. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 704.
80. The choice of law issue in Insurance Corp. of Ireland may have been
intractable because many foreign nations do not allow the extensive pre-trial
discovery that U.S. courts permit. For this reason, the defendant may have
had a genuine objection to producing the disputed documents; in this case the
trial court's sanction for the failure to comply with the discovery order was, in
effect, an assumption of jurisdiction. Id. at 698-99. Perhaps the strongest argu-
ment that might be made on behalf of application of the waiver rule is that
forum procedural rules usually apply, and that the defendant had chosen to
litigate the issue in that particular forum rather than default and later collat-
erally attack.
81. On this issue, the author is indebted to M. Kipp, Inferring Express
1989]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Although a prior assumption of territorial sovereignty is
necessary for the state to base such jurisdiction on consent, this
reason alone does not make the inference of consent unreason-
able or unconstitutional. Territorial sovereignty exists and is a
reasonable basis for state power. It is territoriality, however,
that constitutes the most important part of the jurisdictional
justification - consent plays at most a minor role. Consent-
based analysis is misleading because it assumes that power rests
on nothing more than the defendant's voluntary actions. But
this is false; the old-fashioned notions of territorial sovereignty
that characterized early personal jurisdiction decisions still per-
sist.8 2 Today, the genteel gloss of liberal consent theory merely
hides the raw fact of territoriality.
This realization should cause us, in addition, to take a skep-
tical look at any assertions of sovereignty that territoriality can-
not directly justify; for if territoriality is lacking, it is not clear
in what respect consent can substitute for it. Take for example
the question of a corporation's submission to jurisdiction as a
condition of doing business in a particular state. Many states
require foreign corporations to register, qualify to do business,
and appoint an agent for service of process.8 3 To what extent
does territoriality alone justify this requirement, and to what
extent does the concept of consent provide an essential element
of the justification? Consent is superfluous when the forum
merely claims jurisdiction over the corporation for its activities
within the state. 4 In such cases the state could assert jurisdic-
tion directly, and the foreign corporation registration laws
serve only as a procedure for facilitating service of process.
On the other hand, sometimes a forum claims that such ex-
pressions of consent establish jurisdiction that would not other-
wise exist.8 5 For instance, the forum might rely on the
Consent, The Paradox of Permitting Registration Statutes to Confer General
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1989) (unpublished paper on file with
author).
82. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of Reason,
47 N.C.L. REv. 1, 19-23 (1968) (discussing the content of state statutes regard-
ing foreign corporation laws); Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: A Current
Account, 47 N.C.L. REv. 733, 734-47 (1969) (discussing state foreign corporation
laws).
84. See supra pp. 15-17.
85. See, e.g., Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1111 (Del. 1988) (holding
express consent a valid basis for jurisdiction even where no other basis exists).
But see In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1278 n.10
(D. Md. 1981) (criticizing express consent as a jurisdictional basis).
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corporation's consent to assert a right of general jurisdiction
over litigation arising out of corporate activities elsewhere.
Thus, according to the forum, the defendant's consent auth-
orizes it to assert jurisdiction over the defendant's activities
that are unrelated to the state. In this situation, consent is es-
sential to expansion of the state's jurisdiction because it enables
the state to assert otherwise inappropriate authority.
Although the case law on this issue is not entirely clear,
such assertions of jurisdiction may be unconstitutional.8 6 Pre-
sumably, the state cannot constitutionally exclude an individual
from entering the state or engaging in interstate commercial
activities there.8 7 Of course, the state can require such an indi-
vidual to comply with valid local regulations while doing busi-
ness there; "interstate business must pay its way."88 This right
to regulate locally, however, does not necessarily entitle the
state to regulate the individual's activities elsewhere.8 9 By
using consent to establish general jurisdiction; the state at-
tempts to extract the individual's consent to the extraterritorial
application of its authority. This exercise of state authority,
moreover, apparently threatens to deny the individual a consti-
tutionally protected right: the right to come into the state or
engage in trade there. By consenting to such an arrangement,
the individual relinquishes rights but receives nothing to which
he or she is not already entitled. Thus, the state effectively ex-
pands its power without providing the individual anything in
return.90
Territorial sovereignty does not directly establish a right to
regulate particular activities unrelated to the state; thus, the
state should not be able to achieve indirectly the same effect by
extracting consent. The state cannot withhold a right that the
individual already possesses under the federal constitution, and
it cannot grant such a right in exchange for the individual's
concessions to state authority. Although consent is a superfi-
86. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., 108 S. Ct. 2218,
2220-21 (1988) (holding unconstitutional a state statute that conditioned the
benefits of the statute of limitations on submission to the state's general
jurisdiction).
87. This is a consequence of the right to travel. See Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969).
88. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919).
89. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1909).
90. The Delaware Supreme Court apparently has decided to treat some
expressions of consent as both gratuitous and enforceable; it upheld consent to
general jurisdiction even though, under its analysis, the defendant received
nothing in exchange. Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1112-13 (Del. 1988).
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cially seductive argument, it is less convincing when closely ex-
amined. We cannot unreflectively accept consent-based
arguments. Instead, in each instance, we must identify what
the individual received in return. Usually, the answer is "noth-
ing" - although often this result does not matter because terri-
toriality supplies the missing rationale.
B. IMMIGRATION
At first, immigration law seems to present very different
problems from those involved in judicial jurisdiction. Immigra-
tion law does not address whether a state may reach out to as-
sert its authority over an individual, but rather whether an
individual may enter or remain within the nation-state. A re-
cent book by Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith, however, at-
tempts to explain certain aspects of United States immigration
law in terms of consent theory.9 1 In particular, Schuck and
Smith use consent theory to explain why individuals born
within United States territory should not automatically be enti-
tled to United States citizenship. Although this conclusion con-
flicts with the apparent requirements of the fourteenth
amendment, 92 the authors try to reconcile their conclusion with
the amendment's history93 and also assert that their interpreta-
tion is more consistent with the liberal democratic theory that,
they argue, underlies the constitutional scheme.94
Schuck and Smith's conclusion is undeniably controver-
sial.95 Although some critics strongly disagree with Schuck and
Smith's arguments about the framing of the fourteenth amend-
ment,96 the subject of our analysis is their application of con-
sent theory. Schuck and Smith's basic argument is as follows:
John Locke wrote his famous discussion about consent theory
in response, at least in part, to Coke and Filmer's theory of
91. P. SCHUCK & R. SMTH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside."
93. P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, supra note 91, at 72-89, 129-30.
94. Id at 42-54.
95. For a critical review of P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, supra note 91, see
Neuman, Back to Dred Scot? (Book Review), 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 485 (1987);
Schwartz, The Amorality of Consent (Book Review), 74 CALIF. L. REV. 2143
(1986).
96. Neuman, supra note 95, at 489-97.
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birthright citizenship.97 Filmer's theory was patriarchal and
was written in an effort to offer support for absolute monar-
chy.98 Citizenship under Filmer's theory turned on the place of
one's birth and in this sense, was ascriptive rather than consen-
sual.99 One's obligations to the monarch (like one's citizenship)
resulted from being born in a particular place.
In Schuck and Smith's view, Locke sought to rebut
Filmer's analysis and replace it with a consent-based theory;
this consent requirement, moreover, encompassed both one's
political obligations and one's citizenship.10 0 Under Locke's
view, voluntarism provides the key to a legitimate theory of cit-
izenship.101 As Schuck and Smith argue, recognition of an indi-
vidual as a citizen simply because of his or her place of birth is
not voluntaristic but ascriptive and territorial. Furthermore,
because citizenship and political obligations turn on historical
coincidence, they are arbitrary. Schuck and Smith also assert
that allowing persons to become members without the existing
polity's consent contravenes the consensual foundation of polit-
ical rights and responsibilities in our liberal society.1 02 Birth-
right citizenship is impermissibly ascriptive because citizenship
should turn on the voluntary acts of the individual and the
other members of the polity.10 3
Schuck and Smith's argument has many interesting twists
and turns, such as their ultimate conclusion that the United
States should nonetheless extend citizenship rights to the chil-
dren of current citizens because the current citizens would have
bargained for this right on entering society in the first place. 0 4
Schuck and Smith's consent-based argument also triggers many
interesting objections. For one thing, the fourteenth amend-
ment's apparent provision for birthright citizenship arguably
proves adequate consent.'0 5 One also wonders why such a "con-
sent" theory necessarily gives current citizens the right to
97. P. ScHUcK & R. SIfirrH, supra note 91, at 10, 12-22 (discussing Coke
and Filmer), at 11, 23-26 (discussing Locke's response).
98. Id. at 16-20.
99. Id. at 4, 13-20.
100. Id at 22-27, 31-35.
101. Id. at 36.
102. P. ScHUcK & R. SMITH, supra note 91, at 36, 115.
103. Id- at 21-22, 36, 135-36.
104. Td- at 117.
105. In other words, if Schuck and Smith are wrong on the point of textual
interpretation, see supra note 93 and accompanying text, then they are wrong
on the point of political theory also. If the text actually provides for birthright
citizenship, then consent has been given.
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"blackball" prospective entrants. Ownership of stock in a cor-
poration is consensual in the sense that an individual cannot be
forced to buy or retain shares; yet this "consent" does not nec-
essarily give the current stockholders a veto right over prospec-
tive purchasers. 0 6 When a new homeowner moves into a
neighborhood, purchase of the new home is voluntary; but
"consent" does not enable existing owners to keep new home-
owners out.10 7 Perhaps citizenship is like stock ownership or
living in a neighborhood: who is to say? Consent does not sup-
ply the answer. 0 8
For our purposes, a more central concern is whether, with-
out a prior showing of territorial sovereignty, the consent anal-
ysis can really bear the weight of Schuck and Smith's
argument. Their consent-based argument assumes away many
of the difficult questions about whether current United States
citizens have a valid claim to exclude the children of illegal
aliens. The contract metaphor suggests, first, that we need to
be sensitive to prior assumptions about distribution of property
and sovereignty rights. What sovereignty rights does Schuck
and Smith's argument assume? Schuck and Smith argue that a
certain contract was not made between the current citizens and
the state, rather than that an agreement was made and there-
fore certain political obligations follow.10 9 They also assert that
the current polity must consent to a new member's admission
into citizenship and that birth within the territory cannot es-
tablish such consent."-0 Schuck and Smith's argument thus
seeks to establish a right not to contract.
Schuck and Smith's consent argument relies on several as-
sumptions. Suppose I said, "I refuse to sell you my car," but
you thrust some type of compensation at me and tried to take
my car anyway. My consent-based argument would be that you
cannot force me to sell my property. For my consent argument
to succeed, the car in question must be my car. Although I can
106. This is particularly true in large, publicly-traded corporations.
107. This analogy is from M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 36 (1983).
108. The answer must be found in other notions about what states are, or
should be, like. For example, one might differentiate nation-states from cor-
porations in this respect by acknowledging that one's fellow citizens form an
important part of one's political life and therefore one should have veto power.
The point is merely that it is this theory of the purpose of a state, and not con-
sent theory, which determines whether veto power over would-be entrants
should exist, since other types of membership that are "consensual" are
possible.
109. P. ScHUcK & R. SMITH, supra note 91, at 1.
110. Id- at 128-29, 134-37.
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rightfully refuse to sell you something I own, consent does not
determine whether you may legitimately take from me some-
thing I do not own. This illustration simply reiterates our ear-
lier point that contract law presupposes an initial assignment of
property. This point applies whether we analyze actual agree-
ments or refusals to enter into an agreement.
It is not possible to discuss citizenship and immigration
without acknowledging the importance of pre-existing terri-
torial sovereignty. Schuck and Smith discuss citizenship as if
membership in some private club was at issue.11" Illegal immi-
grants, however, arguably do not want membership per se but
only a right of territorial access. Although sovereignty issues
rarely arise in the context of private clubs," 2 national citizen-
ship clearly involves more than club membership and impli-
cates questions of territorial sovereignty. Immigrants seek
admission to a particular territorial nation-state. It is not clear
whether membership itself matters very much at all, except,
perhaps, as it ensures that the right of entrance will be
permanent.
At the bottom of the consent objection to birthright citizen-
ship is an unexpressed assumption that the current citizens le-
gitimately control some particular piece of land. The consent
argument assumes that current citizens have sovereignty rights
over land and that they are entitled to exclude people from
that land. Without prior territorial sovereignty, the consent
argument fails. Could the current United States polity deny an
outsider the right to emigrate to Canada? Presumably not; out-
siders can only be denied entry into the United States. Under
any theory, access to any Canadian land is not legitimately
within United States control. Consent arguments presuppose
sovereignty, yet an assumption of sovereignty renders consent
theory superfluous.
Furthermore, the territorial right to control parcels of land
is not itself consent-based. Certainly the right to control land is
111. Schuck and Smith discuss territoriality only once - in a list of the
problems of consent theory. Id. at 38-39. There they recognize that territorial-
ity is an important feature of Anglo-American law even though it is ascriptive.
Their response to this obviously non-consensual feature is puzzling- "its as-
criptive aspect can be defended by appealing not to any presumed natural or-
der but simply to the realities of existing national authorities and actual,
interdependent communities." Id at 39.
112. It is possible to hypothesize "sovereignty" arguments in a private club
context. For example, a club might assert a proprietary interest in the club
name, and claim a right to prevent others from using it, even though those
outsiders had not consented.
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not based on everybody's consent - the consent of persons who
are excluded from the land, for example. Although the state's
decisions substantially affect excluded persons, the excluded
have no voice in those decisions. This, perhaps, seems emi-
nently fair if one starts out with the assumption that the ex-
cluded have no right to enter the state except at the generosity
of the current citizens. This conclusion, of course, relies on the
prior distribution of state sovereignty that underlies all consent
arguments in the nation-state context.
If the state's right to exclude people is simply assumed, an
argument for excluding people need not rest on liberal consent
theory. My property right in my car directly explains my right
not to sell my car to you without recourse to any consent no-
tion. Indeed, it only confuses the matter to rely on consent. It
lends an air of high-minded principle to one's decision to ex-
clude. If one holds on to one's property doggedly, despite the
needs of those nearby, then this selfishness is ill-explained by
reference to liberal consent theory. It is simply a result of the
fact that if one chooses not to share, a property right - or sov-
ereignty right - protects this choice. What remains unex-
plained is how the individual - or state - acquired the
sovereignty or property right in the first place.
CONCLUSIONS
Consent often turns out not to be the argument it appears.
Focus on the consensual nature of a transaction distracts atten-
tion from two important features of the state of affairs that
consent typically is used,to justify. First, a consensual transac-
tion does not approve some state of affairs as an absolute mat-
ter, but at most indicates the relative superiority of the post-
transaction state of affairs to the prior status quo. One does not
consent to some state of affairs in the abstract, but only to the
transition from one state of affairs to another. Thus, a particu-
lar political regime cannot use consent theory to compel
obedience.
Second, and as a corollary, consent does not justify the
prior state of affairs. The prior state of affairs in the case of na-
tion-states instead is typically based on territorial sovereignty.
This does not mean that territorial sovereignty cannot be
rationalized - perhaps it can 13 - but the rationalization does
113. The author's reservations are expressed in L. BRILMAYER, supra note
7, at 75-78.
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not proceed in terms of the involved individuals' consent. Con-
sent arguments can be described as a sort of moral "if... then"
argument. If the prior distribution of power was legitimate,
and the obliged individual came within the scope of that power
voluntarily, then the new political obligation also is legitimate.
This phrasing reflects, once more, the structural similarity be-
tween political and market transactions; in market transac-
tions, the resulting distribution is not considered fair but only
Pareto superior"14 to the earlier one.
Although consent-based arguments are not false per se,
they are sometimes misleading and often superfluous. "If...
then" arguments require substantial and important work to es-
tablish the validity of the preconditions necessary for the infer-
ence to follow. The "if" must be shown. Critical examinations
of consent-based arguments must identify the underlying
presuppositions. Territorial sovereignty cannot merely be pos-
ited; its origin requires full-scale philosophical investigation.
The task of explaining territorial sovereignty is akin to justify-
ing the acquisition of private property. Indeed, in the sense
that territory constitutes the "assets" of a state, it represents a
political analog to private property. This analogy may cause a
certain amount of pessimism, because a generally accepted the-
ory of private property does not exist. The comparision does
clearly indicate, however, the direction our energies should
take.
Perhaps the ultimate message is that we should not eagerly
and unreflectively embrace justifications that explain things in
terms of the parties' consent. Beneath liberal arguments about
consent are hidden assumptions that do not seem very liberal at
all. Applications of consent-based reasoning must be dissected
to discover and illuminate such underlying premises. Having
had a clear look, we may decide to retain the assumptions or to
reject them - at least we will make a free and informed
choice.
114. A condition is Pareto superior to another only if at least one individ-
ual is better off and no individual is worse off as a result of the condition. Wi-
ley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REv. 713, 749
n.167 (1986).
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